Law and Social Capital:
Evidence from the Code Napoleon in Germany

Supplementary Appendix (not for publication)

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A Data Appendix

A.1 Data Description and Sources

SOEP Individual measures of social capital (*Trust*, *Coop*, *Fair*), *Life Satisfaction* and *Political Interest*, as well as individual controls for age, gender, location before 1990, household income, employment status, six classes of educational achievement, and five classes of religious denomination are taken from the German Socio-Economic Panel, wave 2003. The SOEP is a representative study of private households in Germany. Individuals are observed at the district in which they live. To use the confidential district of location of each household, the data was analyzed via the SOEPremote system, requiring STATA do-files to be sent to the DIW by e-mail.

Napoleonic Treatment and Historical Controls The treatment definition of the Code Civil, other Napoleonic reforms and historical controls on the province level are taken from Acemoglu et al. (2011). In the complete sample, if not stated differently, Napoleonic treatment is defined as $1900 -$ date of the introduction of the reform.

Geographic Controls Geographic controls measured at the contemporary district level are obtained from the following sources: Distance to river measures the smallest distance from the district border to a major European river (as defined in the map by the Alterra Centre for Geo-Information [http://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/geonetwork/srv/en/main.home]. Suitability of the soil for low-input rain-fed wheat, and the terrain slope index are taken from the FAO-GAEZ database. Distance to the coast measures the smallest distance from the district border to the nearest coast.

Historical City Characteristics Medieval city characteristics regarding Free cities, Hanseatic cities and cities with a Bishop are taken from Jacob (2010). Universities prior to 1800 are defined from the foundation dates of current existing universities provided by the Compass of Universities (*Hochschulkompass*). Importantly, the data reports the earliest foundation date even if the University was closed for some time and re-opened afterwards.

Historical City Population Historical city population before the year 1850 is based on Bairoch, Batou, and Chevre (1988). Since population is missing for several cities and years, I use the interpolated dataset constructed by Voigtländer and Voth (2012). For the post 1850 years 1875, 1900 and 1910, city population data is obtained from the national German statistics (*Statistik des Deutschen Reiches*) as used in Cantoni, 2015. Throughout the paper the log of city population is used.

Late 19th Century Socio-Economic Outcomes Late 19th century socio-economic outcomes of counties originate from different waves of the Prussian census. The data was collected by ifo Prussian Economic History Database (Becker et al., 2012). Religious affiliation and literacy, as well as total population come from the 1871 Population Census. The 1877 Census provides income tax statistics, that is the total amount of class tax and classified income tax. From this I compute the per capita share of total tax in 1877. Shares of labor force in manufacturing (including mining), service and agriculture (without forestry) come from the 1882 occupation census. The 1888 Education Census contains information on the number of full-time male teachers and teacher wages.

Per Capita Income 2005 District level income per capita in 2005 is taken from the regional atlas of the German Statistical Institute (DESTATIS).

Land Inequality and Electoral Fraud Data measuring inequalities in the distribution of land, as well as electoral fraud, is taken from Ziblatt (2009). Land inequality data comes from the 1898 Imperial Statistical Office Census of German agriculture. The underlying data on contested elections has been collected by Dr. Robert Arsenschek from the Reichstag parliamentary minutes and measures all 974 disputed elections discussed in the German Reichstag between 1871 and 1912. Disputed elections can be classified into four categories: manipulations on the election day, local government intervention into

election campaigns, influence of private individuals, for example agrarian or industrial employers, or vote buying. Ziblatt (2009) also provides county data on population, average voter turnout, the share of Catholics, as well as a measure of political competition.

Associations in the 1920s Data on the number of social associations in German cities and towns in the 1920s are from Satyanath, Voigtländer, and Voth (2016). Out of the 229 cities for which data is available, at most 188 fall into sample areas considered. For each city the number of associations per type are reported.

I use all associations that can be classified as either "bridging" or "bonding" types of social capital, following the classification in Satyanath, Voigtländer, and Voth (2016) and the work by Putnam (2001). Clubs that fall into the "bridging" social capital category are gymnastic clubs, sports clubs, breeder clubs, choirs, music clubs, chess clubs, hiking clubs, homeland clubs, citizen clubs and a number of other minor, predominately artistic clubs. Associations that belong to "bonding" social capital are military and paramilitary clubs, students and fraternities, corps, lodges and gentlemen clubs. Associations that cannot be assigned unambiguously to either category are oldfellows, shooting, hunting, youth and women's clubs.

Association density is defined as the total number of bridging and bonding associations per city divided by 1,000 inhabitants, using population measures from Falter and Hänisch (1990) for the year 1925. The share of bridging associations is defined as the number of bridging associations per city divided by the total number of bridging and bonding associations.

Shooting Associations The data on shooting clubs were assembled by Walter M. Plett (1991) for a dissertation on the evolution of shooting associations in Rhineland and Westphalia. The data set includes the name of the association, the current (1991) district it belongs to, the foundation date, and the source. The main sources that identify the foundation year are reports given by current clubs themselves, supported by archival material. A second important source are the membership lists of subordinated associations (as on the provincial level). The earliest foundation date reported in the data is the year 1076, the last 1985. I only use data for the years from 1700 to 1900.

Importantly, Plett did not change self-reported foundation dates or those taken from the membership lists, even if historical sources do not support this date. Although misreporting cannot be ruled out for the time period 1700-1900, it is important to note that, first, from the examples he gives about misreporting, it can be inferred, that this problem is more pronounced for clubs that have been founded before 1700. Second, there is no reason to believe that misreporting affected one of the two provinces more strongly.

To define treatment, I keep the original classification of counties to the provinces of Rhineland and Westphalia, except for the counties of Essen, Mülheim (Ruhr), Rees and Duisburg. Those counties belonged to the region of the Rhineland, but did not keep the Code Civil after 1815.

The data can be accessed through the GESIS data catalogue:
http://info1.za.gesis.org/DBKSearch12/SDESC2.asp?no=8112&db=E

A.2   Merging historical and current districts

As county borders changed constantly in the German Empire, counties in different waves of the ifo Prussian Economic History Database, and of the German Electoral Constituencies in 1898 that is used in Ziblatt (2009), differ from contemporaneous county borders. To assign treatment to historical administrative units, I first match the centroid of each historical district with counties in 2003 using ArcGIS. Treatment status is then defined to be equal to the treatment of the contemporaneous district the historical county is located, to ensure comparability of the results. Note that few electoral constituencies are

divided into two or more parts. In that case I only use the centroid of the largest part for the match and discard the smaller parts. An identical procedure is applied when assigning treatment to cities.[1]

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[1]Alternatively, I merged historical counties to counties as in 2003 by overlaying maps of historical counties with present day counties using ArcGIS. County level variables are then computed as weighted averages, where the weight is the area that is shared by the historical and the current district. This procedure generates very similar results, but relies on the strong assumption that population is distributed uniformly and the weighting procedure potentially creates more noisy variables.

B   Additional Statistics and Results

B.1   Additional Results Complete Sample

Table B1: Factors Determining the Adoption of the Code Civil

Dependent variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			Years of Code Civil			
Duration of French Presence	3.923***					3.327
	(1.012)					(2.051)
Share of Protestants 1800		-56.846				-24.193
		(37.917)				(31.895)
Urbanization Rate 1800			-0.965			-0.442
			(1.531)			(1.022)
Distance to Paris				-0.122*		0.031
				(0.060)		(0.074)
Number of Territories					1.245	0.670
					(0.797)	(0.618)
R-squared	0.44	0.23	0.02	0.27	0.28	0.56
Observations	16	16	16	16	16	16

Notes: OLS regressions. Heterosecedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. $^*p < 0.10,^{**}p < 0.05,^{***}p < 0.01$

Table B2: Alternative Econometric Specifications

	Dummy	Dummy at least 90 Years	Linear Spline at 7 Years	Linear Spline at 25 Years	Quadratic
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dependent variable:			*Trust*		
Code Civil (=1 if Code Civil >=0)	0.021 (0.028)				
Code Civil (=1 if Code Civil >=90)		0.098*** (0.035)			
Code Civil < 7 Years			0.330 (0.717)		
Code Civil > 7 Years			0.157*** (0.046)		
Intercept 7 Years			-0.025 (0.066)		
Code Civil < 25 Years				0.029 (0.497)	
Code Civil > 25 Years				0.138 (0.108)	
Intercept 25 Years				0.024 (0.134)	
Code Civil					0.001 (0.002)
Code Civil squared					-0.000 (0.000)
Observations	17664	17664	17664	17664	17664
R-squared	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
No. of Clusters	349	349	349	349	349

Notes: OLS regressions. The unit of observation is an individual. All regressions control for macro-region fixed effects, the full set of controls at the individual level, as well as geographic and historical controls as in Table 3, Panel C. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.10,^{**}p < 0.05,^{***}p < 0.01$

Table B3: Complete Sample, all Controls Reported

Dependent variables:	(1) Trust	(2) Coop	(3) Fair
Code Civil (x100)	0.126***	0.163***	0.041
	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.028)
Base Controls (omitted religious category: other Christian religion)			
Age	-0.001	-0.010***	-0.010***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age sq.	0.000	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Male	0.016**	-0.020***	-0.041***
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Protestant	0.040	0.018	0.065*
	(0.037)	(0.032)	(0.038)
Catholic	0.020	0.013	0.029
	(0.040)	(0.032)	(0.039)
Other Non Christian	-0.056	0.057	-0.034
	(0.049)	(0.038)	(0.043)
None	-0.012	-0.022	0.012
	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.039)
GDR before 1990	-0.075***	-0.018	-0.023
	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Additional Individual Controls (omitted education category: No degree)			
Secondary School (13 years)	0.154***	0.002	0.078***
	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Secondary School (12 years)	0.049*	-0.053**	0.004
	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.024)
Middle School (10 years)	-0.035	-0.044***	-0.027
	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Middle School (9 years)	-0.126***	-0.041**	-0.073***
	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Other degree	-0.078***	-0.020	-0.041*
	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Unemployment	-0.122***	-0.066***	-0.107***
	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.016)
HH Income	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Historical Controls (post- and pre-treatment)			
Urbanization Rate 1850	0.000	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Latitude	-0.019	-0.040	-0.007
	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.034)
Longitude	-0.019	-0.072	-0.009
	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.045)
Urbanization rate 1800	-0.006	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Share Protestants 1800	0.097	0.112**	0.030
	(0.060)	(0.052)	(0.051)
Distance to Paris	0.001	0.001*	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Geographic Controls			
Distance River	0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Slope	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Wheat Suitability	0.026**	0.011	0.010
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.007)
Distance Coast	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	17664	17664	17664
R-squared	0.07	0.05	0.04
No. of Clusters	349	349	349

Notes: OLS regressions as Table 3, Panel D. The unit of observation is an individual. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. $*p < 0.10$, $**p < 0.05$, $***p < 0.01$

B.2 Additional Results Border Sample

Table B4: Border Estimates: Separated Geographic Controls

Dependent variables:	(1) *Trust*	(2) *Coop*	(3) *Fair*
a) Distance to Major River			
Border	0.082**	0.097***	0.051*
	(0.034)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Distance to River	0.000	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
b) Terrain Slope			
Border	0.070**	0.071**	0.037*
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.020)
Slope	0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
c) Wheat Suitability			
Border	0.075**	0.073**	0.035*
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.020)
Wheat Suitability	0.024	0.008	-0.003
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.011)
d) Distance to Coast			
Border	0.072**	0.070**	0.035*
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.020)
Distance to Coast	-0.000	0.001***	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	6359	6359	6359
No. of Clusters	110	110	110

Notes: OLS regressions. The unit of observation is an individual. All regressions control for the full set of individual controls, geographic controls, as well as State fixed effects. See main text and section A.1 in the Appendix for a description of the variables. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. $*p < 0.10$, $**p < 0.05$, $***p < 0.01$

Table B5: Smoothness of Individual Covariates at the Border

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)
							High-School										
	Male	Age	Age Sq	9 years	8 years	6 years	5 years	Other Degree	No Degree	Catholic	Protestant	Other Christ	Other Rel	No Rel	Unemployed	East Before 1990	HH Income
Border	-0.006	0.389	34.959	0.034	0.003	-0.015	-0.010	0.002	-0.014*	0.088***	-0.035	-0.024***	-0.018	-0.011	-0.005	-0.006	-12.897
	(0.007)	(0.524)	(51.883)	(0.026)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.025)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(105.479)
Observations	6359	6359	6359	6359	6359	6359	6359	6359	6359	6359	6359	6359	6359	6359	6359	6359	6359

Notes: OLS regressions. The unit of observation is an individual. See main text for a description of the variables. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. $*p < 0.10$, $**p < 0.05$, $***p < 0.01$

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Table B6: Testing for Economic Effects at Alternative Points in Time

Panel A: Complete Sample

Dependent variables:	(1) (ln) City Population 1875	(2) (ln) City Population 1910	(3) City Population Growth 1850-1900
Code Civil (x100)	-0.046	-0.119	-0.106
	(0.137)	(0.133)	(0.163)
(ln) Population 1850			0.249***
			(0.046)
Macro-Region Fe	Yes	Yes	Yes
Geographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Historical Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	211	211	207
R-squared	0.08	0.09	0.17

Panel B: Border Sample

Dependent variables:	(1) (ln) City Population 1875	(2) (ln) City Population 1910	(3) City Population Growth 1850-1900
Border	0.087	0.004	-0.034
	(0.262)	(0.364)	(0.180)
(ln) Population 1850			0.342***
			(0.072)
Geographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	67	67	64
R-squared	0.05	0.08	0.25

Notes: This table reports regressions for the complete sample in Panel A, controlling for macro-region fixed effects, as well as geographic and historical controls as in Table 3, Panel C. Panel B reports regressions for the border sample, controlling for geographical characteristics. The unit of observation is the city in columns (1) - (3). See main text and section A.1 in the Appendix for a description of the variables. Standard errors clustered at the historical territory reported in parentheses in Panel A. Heterosecedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses in Panel B. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B7: Post-Treatment Economic Effects around the Border: Alternative Specifications

Panel A: RDD, quadratic in Long/Lat

Dependent variables:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	(ln) City Population		*City Population Growth*	*(ln) Gdp p.c. 2005*
	1850	*1900*	*1800-1900*	
Border	0.248	0.208	-0.145	0.003
	(0.295)	(0.491)	(0.389)	(0.026)
(ln) Population 1800			0.173	
			(0.193)	
Geographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.13	0.14	0.20	0.23
Observations	65	67	67	110

Panel B: Moving Border Inside

Dependent variables:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	(ln) City Population		*City Population Growth*	*(ln) Gdp p.c. 2005*
	1850	*1900*	*1800-1900*	
Border	0.525	0.655	-0.332	-0.021
	(0.333)	(0.453)	(0.292)	(0.022)
(ln) Population 1800			0.225	
			(0.184)	
Geographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	45	46	46	75
R-squared	0.14	0.09	0.10	0.20

Panel C: Moving Border Outside

Dependent variables:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	(ln) City Population		*City Population Growth*	*(ln) Gdp p.c. 2005*
	1850	*1900*	*1800-1900*	
Border	0.085	0.032	0.181	0.001
	(0.189)	(0.278)	(0.210)	(0.017)
(ln) Population 1800			0.134	
			(0.231)	
Geographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	56	57	57	96
R-squared	0.13	0.09	0.13	0.33

Notes: This table reports regressions for the border sample, controlling for geographical characteristics. Panel A controls for a quadratic polynomial in longitude and latitude. Panel B and C report estimation results when the border is moved inwards and outwards. The unit of observation is the city in columns (1) - (3), and the district in column (4). See main text and section A.1 in the Appendix for a description of the variables. Heterosecedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B8: Code Civil and City Growth: Complete Sample

Dependent variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)
		(ln) City Population	
Post 1800 x Code Civil	0.003**	0.004***	
	(0.001)	(0.001)	
Code Civil	-0.002		
	(0.001)		
Post 1800	1.128***		
	(0.057)		
Code Civil x Year 1750			0.002*
			(0.001)
Code Civil x Year 1800			0.003**
			(0.001)
Code Civil x Year 1850			0.005***
			(0.002)
Code Civil x Year 1875			0.005***
			(0.002)
Code Civil x Year 1900			0.006***
			(0.002)
Code Civil x Year 1910			0.006***
			(0.002)
Observations	1412	1412	1412
R-squared	0.28	0.75	0.75
City FE	No	Yes	Yes
Year FE	No	Yes	Yes
No. of Clusters	214	214	214

Notes: This table reports difference-in-differences estimation in the complete sample for the period 1700 to 1910. The unit of observation is the city. Standard errors clustered at the city reported in parentheses. See main text and section A.1 in the Appendix for a description of the variables. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C Additional Figures

Figure C.1: Legal Systems in 19th Century Germany

Notes: This map is the underlying map for Figure 2 of the main text. Translation of the legend:
Civil Law in Germany in the 19th century (heading). *1)* Code Civil, 1804. *2)* National modification of the Code Civil. *3)* ALR, 1794. *4)* Common Law (roman Law of the Holy Roman Empire). *5)* Saxonian Civil Code, 1865. *6)* Austrian Civil Code, 1811.
*Source*: 200 years Code Civil: Exposition in the Federal Archive, Koblenz, in Stein (2004).

Figure C.2: Code Civil and 19th Century City Population (Cross-Sectional Estimations)

(a) Post-Treatment City Population in the Complete Sample

(b) Post-Treatment City Population at the Border

Notes: This figure plots point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of regressions as in Tables 10 and B6, using (ln) population of cities between 1800 and 1910 as dependent variables.

Figure C.3: Code Civil and per capita Income in 2005 at the Border

Notes: This figure plots point estimates and 95% confidence of regressions using income per capita in 2005 as dependent variable.

Figure C.4: Code Civil and City Population (Panel Estimation)

Notes: This figure plots point estimates and 95% confidence of the fully flexible panel estimation in Table 10, Panel C, column (4), using (ln) city population between 1700 and 1910 as dependent variable.

Figure C.5: Evolution of Economic Outcomes around the Border

(a) Evolution of City Population at the Border


(b) Evolution of Urbanization Rates in Border Territories

Notes: This figure shows the evolution of average city sizes in cities located around the border in figure a), and the average urbanization rates for historical territories located at the border in figure b). Treated territories in figure b) are Baden, Bavarian Palatinate and Rhineland. Untreated territories are Bavaria, Hesse-Darmstadt, Mark, Westphalia, and Wuerttemberg.

Figure C.6: Evolution of Shooting Clubs

(a) Mean No of Clubs founded

(b) Total of Clubs

Notes: This figure shows the evolution of shooting associations in the two provinces Rhineland and Westphalia. Figure a) displays the average number of clubs founded per district and period, while Figure b) shows the cumulative number of clubs per territory.

D   Historical Territories in the Sample and Treatment

Table D1: Territories and Reform Definitions

Territory	Code Civil	Serfdom	Agrarian Reform	Guilds	Reform Index	Description
Baden	90	117	80	38	81.25	Grand Duchy of Baden. Adopted Code Civil without French occupation in 1815.
Bavaria Old	0	92	74	32	49.5	Southern part of the Kingdom of Bavaria.
Bavarian Palatinate	98	102	96	105	100.25	Western enclave of Bavaria, left of Rhine.
Brandenburg	0	89	79	90	64.5	Prussian Province of Brandenburg, including Berlin.
Brunswick	6	76	75	43	50	Duchy of Brunswick.
Hanover	5	73	72	38	47	Prussian Province of Hanover.
Hessen-Darmstadt, right of the Rhine	0	89	84	34	51.75	Grand Duchy of Hesse, without the part left of the Rhine (Rhenish-Hesse).
Hessen-Kassel	6	74	73	39	48	The Electorate of Hesse as in 1814.
Mark	5	92	75	91	65.75	Core of Ruhr Area.
Mecklenburg-Schwerin	0	80	38	31	37.25	Grand Duchy of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, as in 1815.
Rhineland	98	102	96	105	100.25	The Rhine Province as of 1815. The districts Essen, Duisburg, Oberhausen, Wesel and Muehlheim (Ruhr) are coded as not having applied the Code Civil after 1815.
Saxony	35	68	68	38	52.25	Kingdom of Saxony. Applied a Civil Code comparable to the Code Civil from 1865 to 1900.
Saxony Province	7	92	91	91	70.25	Saxony Province of Prussia as inn 1815.
Schleswig-Holstein	0	95	95	33	55.75	Province of Prussia in the borders of 1867.
Westphalia without Mark	5	92	75	91	65.75	Prussian Province of Westphalia as in 1815.
Wuerttemberg	0	83	64	38	46.25	Kingdom of Wuerttemberg as in 1806.

Notes: Coding of reforms for all territories included in the sample. Serfdom refers to the abolition of serfdom, agrarian reform to the enactment of the *Abloesungsordnung*, and guilds to the abolition of guilds. The value for each reform variable x is evaluated at the year 1900 and therefore computed as $x = 1900 -$ Year of Enactement. The reform index is a combined index of all variables at the year 1900. Data is taken from Acemoglu et al., 2011.

Table D2: Correlation of Code Civil and alternative Reforms

	Code Civil Correlation	N
Abolition of Serfdom	.61	16
Agrarian Reform	.45	16
Abolition of Guilds	.40	16
Reform Index	.85	16

Figure D.1: Historical Territories

Historical Territory
- 0 - Not in Sample
- 1 - Baden
- 2 - Bavaria Old
- 3 - Bavarian Palatinate
- 4 - Brandenburg
- 5 - Brunswick
- 6 - Hanover
- 7 - Hesse-Darmstadt, right of the Rhine
- 8 - Hesse-Kassel
- 9 - Mark
- 10 - Mecklenburg-Schwerin
- 11 - Rhineland
- 12 - Saxony
- 13 - Saxony Province
- 14 - Schleswig-Holstein
- 15 - Westpahlia, without Mark
- 16 - Wuerttemberg

Notes: This maps shows the 16 historical territories included in the sample.

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